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IN THE SUPRHIE COL: RT OF TllF STA TE OF l'T,\H
SYNERGETICS, A Utah Limited
Partnership, by and through
its general partner, LANCER
INDUSTRIES, INC. , a
corporation; and ADDLAND
ENTERPRISES, INC. ,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

)
)

MARATHON RANCHING CO.,
LTD., and HANS W. ROECK,

Case No.

19143

Defendants-Appellants,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for money damages and for rescission of
an agreement providing for the exchange of certain real properc
purportedly owned by defendant Marathon Ranching Col, Ltd.,
located in the Province of Saskatchewan, Canada, for an oceangoing sailboat owned by plaintiffs alleging that the transaccior.
was the product of defendants'

fraud, misrepresentations and

deceit.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COCRT
After the distric court denied defendants'

tc dis-

miss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and defendants
repeatedly refused to comply with disccverv

-

1 -

defJult

failed to produce documents as ordered and when Roeck repeatedly
failed to appear for the taking of his deposition pursuant to
repeated orders of the court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment of the lower
court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Facts Re Exchange Transaction:
The statement of facts submitted by counsel for defendants
is imcomplete and in some instances inaccurate; accordingly the
following is submitted as a statement of facts:
l.

In May, 1980, plaintiffs exchanged an ocean-going

sail boat with a value of approximately $352,000.00 for an
agreement from Harathon Ranching Co., Ltd.

("MARATHON"), a

Canadian corporation.of which Hans W. Roeck ("ROECK") was
president for alleged clear title to a quarter section of land
(160 acres - Rl6,

34) in Canada and the agreement of Marathon

to assume and pay an obligation of about $200,000.00 owed to
General Electric Credit Corporation ("GECC") which was secured
by the boat.
7

(R.

2-4, 16, 17-20, 30-39, 231-249 and 272-277).

Defendants took possession of the boat, failed to make

any payments whatever thereon (which resulted in plaintiffs
being required to make payments of $2,419.12 per month on the
GECC loan).

failed to keep the boat insured as required by the

GCCC loan. concealed the whereabouts of the boat, removed it to
L1r.iti .md from there to some unknown place.
anJ

2

(R. 2-4, 17-20, 30-39,

3.

The $7,500.00 check issued

1

dcfcnddnts 3S part pa;-

ment was dishonored by the bank and wds never p3id (R.
4.

3,

246)

Plaintiffs claim th3t the Canadi3n land was not as

represented and that their

to accept that land in

exchange for the boat was the result of fraud and deceit
practiced by the defendants upon the plaintiffs.

Among the

misrepresentations and omissions bv defendants are the following:

(a) the land was represented by defendants to be readily

marketable and to have a fair market value of $320,000 (R.

35),

however its maximum market value (had title been clear) did not
exceed $18,000.00 (&. 275);
in the bush country;

(b) the land was located 120 miles

(c) it was represented to be treed and to

have meadows sloping to a ''shallow gradual declining,

safe.

sandy beach'' adjoining a lake (R. 131), whereas in fact it
has a high, steep bank which separates the balance of the land
from the beach.

Much of the land is swampy and the adjoining

lake water is filled with reeds.

It is extremely doubtful that

subdivision of the land W<>ould be permitted under local law,
and if it were permitted a substantial portion of the land
would be required to be donated for public benefit under local
law (most likely the beach area)

It is highly urlikely that

realtors would be interested in showing the land because of the
long distances involved, poor roads, and because other land
in the area was available for
cost of this land.

fraction of the proposed

Title to the land was not marketable for

various reasons including claims by
whom the defendant had sold the same land, a

to

tax sale fc

unpaid property taxes, execution levied on the property by
the holder of a judgment against the defendants, outstanding
mortgages on the property given by the defendants, etc.
(R.

239-24-, 272-277).
5.

After the exchange occurred and the boat was delivered

to defendants Reeck came to Utah (about March, 1981) and
negotiated a substantial modification of the exchange agreement
(R.

34) to entirely change the quarter section of land being

received by plaintiffs for a different quarter section; to give
defendants the right to "deal with these lands in preparation
for a subdivision and other investors' participation," subject
only to defendants' agreement to protect the $100,000.00 price
which plaintiffs were to receive for that land.
new agreement was signed by all parties in Utah.

(R. 34).

The

Some of the

misrepresentations relied upon by plaintiffs were made in
connection with negotiations for the modification agreement in
Utah,

including the representations therein that the land was

subdividable and that defendants were "in preparation for a
subdivision."
6.

(R. 34, 272-277).

Plaintiffs claim that most of the misrepresentations

made by defendants in connection with negotiating the original
contract (R.

16) and the modification agreement (R. 34) were

also made in long distance telephone calls between agents of
plaintiffs and Reeck and by letters written by defendants and
:nailed into Utah.

(R. 31-39, 231-249).

Counsel for defendants

incorrectly assert (P. 6 of brief) that Roeck's affidavit in

- 4 -

support of defendarts' motion to quash was nut Lountcred bv
an affidavit from plaintiff

T,1

tht: cnrt rary,

3f:::er RcH:::>C\<'"

s

affidavit was filed, plaintiffs filed an amended verified
complaint setting forth in detail the contacts with the State
of Utah upon which Plaintiffs' claims of long drm jurisdiction
was based.

(R.

30-33).

Facts Re Court Proceedings:
7.

Defendants' moved to quash service of summons with

supporting affidavit and memorandum of authorities, which
claimed that the entire transaction,

the subject matter of the

lawsuit, was negotiated and executed outside of the State of
Utah and that there were insufficient minimal contacts with Ctah
for long arm jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs responded bv an amended

complaint with supporting exhibits and affidavit (R.

30-39)

spelling out specific contacts and transactions by defendants
in the State of Utah, including:
(a)

Telephone calls from Reeck, v.·ho was out of

state, to agents of plaintiffs, who were in Ctah,
which telephone calls, defendants repeated most or all of
the misrepresentations alleged in the original complaint
(R. 31, , S(a) R. 235-249).

Some of these calls included

negotiations for the exchange agreement
(b)

<R

31,

16)

Reeck came to Ctah and while there negc:iated.

drafted and signed the new agreement which substituted
different land for the land originallv

- 5 -

to te

conveyed to plaintiffs in exchange for the boat.

The

Ct ah agreement also included an additional written misrepresentation to the effect that the land said to be
conveyed to plaintiffs could be and was in process of
being subdivided, which was false.

That fraudulent

misrepresentation is one of the fraud claims asserted
in the lawsuit.
(c)

(R.

31,

5(b)).

Reeck made numerous telephone calls into Utah

both before and after execution of both agreements
(R.

31,

'I 5(c)).

(d)

Defendants caused purported title to the Canadian

land to be mailed into Utah by his Canadian attorney
(R.

31,

5 (e), R.

(e)
(R.

37-38)

Reeck sent a telegram into Utah on June 10, 1981,

32, , 5 (e), R. 39) in furtherance of the scheme to

defraud.
8.

About June 5, 1982, plaintiffs filed a request for

production of documents, which required plaintiff to respond
bv Julv 12, 1982, and served notice of the taking of Roeck's
deposition on Julv 16, 1982.
9.

(R. 44-47).

About June 8, 1982, defendants petitioned the Supreme

Court for an interlocutory appeaL re denial of their motion
to quash (R. 87).

[See Supreme Court case No. 18504 - notice

of denial of that ?etition was received by counsel about July
1982 (R.

73, 'I 6))]

- 6 -

10. July 15. 1982. defendants •Jl t3inc'd a protecti\•e orJc·r
excusing Roeck from appearing for his deposition which was
scheduled for Julv 16. 1982. but ordered that Ro"ck appear at
the office of counsel for plaintiff and submit to the taking of
his deposition within five (5) business davs after notice of
denial of defendants' petition for interlocutory appeal (R. 63.

90-92).

A copy of that order is attached as appendix "A".

11. July 22. 1982, notice received denying petition for
interlocutory appeal (R.

73); accordinglv under the order

Roeck had through July 29. 1982. to appear for his deposition

12. Julv 28. 1982. defendants moved for a protective
order seeking to be excused from the Julv 29. 1982. deposition.
alleging that Roeck was ill with Pancreatitis and back pain.
was still in Hawaii and unable to travel. asking that the
orders mentioned in (appendix "A") be vacated.
The medical statement furnished stated disahilit:1 through
August 6 . 19 8 2 . ( R.

71- 7 9 . 99-101) .

13. July 29. 1982. plaintiffs moved (with supporting memu
of authorities) for sanctions by reason of defendants'

failure

to produce documents and failure of Roeck to appear for his
deposition as ordered by the Court (R. 96-08. 102-107 and

108-109).
16. August 9. 1982. Court orders
in notice of June J,

1982,

8 alcove)

documents requested
DCC

proouc·ecd 'J:: i\.cgust lt·

1982. and that Roeck appear for takin;; of '.;is deposition b:;
Auoest J7. 1982.

(P..

110. 137-138)

are attached hereto as appendix "E"

Co:ci.e,c

":iid ur"'c·rc:

15. August 18, 1982, defendants "respond" to June 5, 1982,
request for production of documents by attaching additional
copies of documents which nad been attached to defendants'
April 15, 1982, memorandum of authorities (R. 16-17) and copies
of documents which plaintiffs had attached to their amended
complaint (R. 34-39), and by stating that the other documents
which had been requested were not produced because they were
not in the possession of defendants' counsel.

(R. ll8,

2).

Absolutely no documents that were not already in the file were
produced by defendants at that time or at any time thereafter.
(R.

250-251).
16. August 18, 1982, defendants move to change deposition

date of Sept. 13, 1982, claiming that Roeck was still in Hawaii,
was still ill, and that counsel had been unable to contact
Roeck until August 15, 1982.

No affidavit or statement from a

physician was filed in support of the alleged illness.
17. August 18, 1982, Roeck deposition noticed for August 27,
1982, pursuant to court order (see II 14 above).

(R. 136).

18. August 26, 1982, Court orders that Roeck appear for his
deposition no later than September 3, 1982, and that if he fails
to do so upon ex-paity application of counsel for plaintiffs the
answer of defendants will be struck and judgment entered for
relief requested in complaint.

(R. 144, 157-168).

Copies of

said orders are attached hereto as appendix "C".
19. September 3, 1982, Roeck appeared for his deposition
with attorney John T. Anderson, Esq. of the firm of Roe and

- 8 -

Fowler.

After 15 minutes of deposition (15 pages) Roeck became

angry about the questions being asked and, against the advice of
his counsel who advised him that if he left his pleadings miglil
be struck (Roeclc Deposition P. 14-15), terminated the
by leaving.

The questions being asked pertained to plaintiffs'

claim that Roeck went through a collusive divorce as a part of
a scheme to convey his assets in fraud of creditors (Roeck
deposition,

P. 3-15, R.

212, ,

2).

No questions had yet been

asked concerning the exchange of the boat for the Canadian land
or the other transactions between the parties.
appeared to complete his deposition.

Roeck has never

(R. 250-251).

Before leaving the deposition Mr. Roeck stated.while still
under oath, "The boat doesn't exist anymore.

It sunk."

Deposition P. 15, L. 9), which statement was untrue.
10; R. 213, '

4).

(R.

276,

Mr. Roeck also stated "I' 11 see you maybe

some time the next three years."
L. 10-11).

(Roeck

(Roeck deposition P. 15,

Copies of pages 14 and 15 of the Roeck deposition

are attached as appendix "D".
Thereafter Roeck stated by affidavit that he would attend
a rescheduled deposition if given an opportunity to do so (R. 206'
The Court gave Roeck that opportunity but Roeck again failed to
appear and the defendants failed to produce the required documents.

(see '

22 below)

20. September 8, 1982, counsel for plaintiffs mailed to
counsel for defendants a motion for sanctions for failure of
defendants to
appear for his deposition,

and fer

Reeck to

(which appears to have been omitted

-

q

-

from the record - copy attached as appendix "E") and on
October 6, 1982, filed a supplemental motion for sanctions
(R. 171-175), then by stipulation that motion was continued
without date (R.

177-179) pending possible settlement (R. 220)

then both motions were re-noticed for hearing November 18, 1982,
when no settlement offer was received (R. 218).
21. October 22, 1982, defendants filed memorandum of
authorities in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for sanctions
(R.

183-203) with affidavit of Roeck offering to return to

Utah to complete his deposition.

(R. 204-206) .

22. November 18, 1982, Court ordered (R. 222-225) that
defendants produce all documents required by the request for
production of June 5, 1982,

8 above - R. 44-47) and that

Roeck appear for his deposition on or before November 29, 1982,
and that if they failed to do so their answer would be struck
and judgment entered.

Roeck failed to appear for his deposi-

tion and the documents were not produced.

(R. 250-251).

Copies

of those orders are attached as appendix "F".
23. December 1, 1982, notice of withdrawal by Roe

& Fowler

as counsel for defendants, stating that there had been no oral
communication with Roeck since September 10, 1982, and no
written communication since October 7, 1982; that defendants
had failed to pay attorney fees; but offering to remain in the
case for purposes of a Rule SS(b)(2), URCP, hearing
on short notice.

(R.

226).

- 10 -

re damages,

24. December 23,

nlaintiffs move tu strike answer

and enter default judgment.
25. December 29,

(R

2 S ll - S 1) .

1982, Court grants motion to strike

answer and enter default judgment.

Mr

Goss of Roe

attended that hearing on behalf of defenJants

& Fowler

(R. 252)

A cor

of that order is attached as appendix "G".
26. January 5, 1983, Mr. Jones, California counsel for
defendants, filed an unverified objection to the proposed judgment submitted by plaintiffs' counsel (R.

266-271) asserting

that there had been no hearing re damages and that Reeck had
received no notice of recent proceedings or orders.
27. Februarv 14, 1983, Court on its own motion ordered a
hearing on defendants'objections.

(R.

258,

the minute entries are attached as appendix

28.

264).
11

Copies of

1-i".

February 25, 1983, Court holds hearing re objection

to proposed order; orders that judgment enter upon filing of an
affidavit re actual and punitive damages. quieted title to
boat in plaintiffs; denied request for lien on Canadian
property.

Attorneys Joel Dangerfield and Ronald Goss of Roe

&

Fowler appeared at that hearing on behalf of defendants.
(R.

265).

Copv of minute entry attached as appendix "I".

29. March 2, 1983, affidavit in support of damages mailed
(R.

272-277).
30. March 14, 1983, judgment signed bv Court, a copy of

which is furnished herewith as appendi.x "J" for the cunvcenien.·c

of the Court.

31. Although J 1/2 months passed between the time when
Roeck lase failed co appear for his deposition and co produce
documents (see
ment (see ,

22 above) and the date of entry of the judg-

30 above) the defendants did not offer co produce

Reeck for the taking of his deposition and did not produce
the required documents.

Reeck had an opportunity co but did

not appear for the hearing re entry of judgment held February
25, 1983,

(R.

26, Appendix "I" hereto), co explain to the

Court reasons for his prior nonappearance, which hearing was
held almost 3 months after the last date by which he should
have appeared for the caking of his deposition (see ,

22 above).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT SUFFICIENT MINIMAL CONTACT
EXISTED BETWEEN DEFENDANTS AND THE STATE OF UTAH FOR LONG ARM
JURISDICTION.
32. Defendants'

16 pages of citations and argument re

due process requirements for long arm jurisdiction (P. 9 thru
25) cite only four Utah cases (P. 12, 16, and 18).

Decisions

from other jurisdictions may be helpful but are not controlling
upon the Utah Courts.

Although many of the decisions cited by

defendants recite correct general legal concepts, since the
Utah long-arm differes from the long arm statutes of the
various states chose decisions are of limited assistance in
applying the Utah Long Arm Statute co the facts in our case.

- 12 -

The Utah Long Arm Court decisions onJ statute
in

discussed

33 below and corrections to anJ discussion of

asserted in defendants' brief are discussed in, 34 through 38
below.
33. Utah long arm statute and decisions.

The l'tah Long-

Arm Statute 78-27-24, UCA, 1953, reads in part as follows
"Any person,
. who .
. does any of the following acts, submits himself,
. to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising
from:
(1)
The transaction of anv business within this
state;

(2)
(3)

The causing of any injury within this state;
whether tortious or by breach of warranty;"
(Emphasis added)

That statute must be read together with 78-27-23(2), l:CA,

1953,

which reads in part as follows:
''(2) The words 'transaction of business within this
state' mean activities of a nonresident person,
his agents, or representatives in this state
which affect persons or businesses within the
State of Utah." (Emphasis added)
In construing those statutes the Utah Supreme Court has set
forth the following basic rules and requirements for exercise
of long-arm jurisdiction
(a)

An activity which would bring a non-resident

tortfeasor within the Utah long-arm statute must be
something done by the party himself or by his agent.
Hanks v. Adm. of Est. of Jensen,

531 P.2d 363

[In our

case Roeck himself placed long distance calls into l'tah
and therein engaged in preliminary negotiations for the

- 13 -

original and supplemental contracts, purposefully came
to Ctah and there renegotiated the consideration to be
received by plaintiffs from the exchange.

Reech made

misrepresentations of fact both in the telephone calls
and while in Utah renegotiating for the supplemental
contract].
(b)

Minor negotiations are insufficient without more.

Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257.
[In our case the acts of Reeck in Utah were not "minor,"
and in fact the supplemental agreement which was made
in Utah substantially altered palintiffs' rights].
(c)

Making of a small single retail purchase in Utah

by out of state visitor is insufficient, it being required
under "fair play and substantial justice" notions that
there must be some activity of a more substantial and
purposeful nature.
596.

Dahnken, Inc. v. Marshinsky, 580 P.2d

[The Utah activity to Reeck was of a "substantial

and purposeful nature].
(d)

Sufficient "minimum contacts" were found to

exist where a non-resident purposefully contracted with
a Utah corporation knowing that goods wouid be likely
to be used in Utah and derived substantial economic
benetit from the plaintiff.
Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244.

Burt Drilling, Inc. v.
[In our case defendants pur-

posefully contracted with plaintiffs in Utah knowing
that Synergetics was a Utah partnership, and derived
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substantial economic benefit from plaintiffs]
(e)

The "doing business" concept Jiffers from the

"minimal contacts" concept in that unJer the former onc'-'
it is shown that defendant has conducteJ substantial and
continuous business activity within the forum state,
defendant is subject to litigation related or unrelated
to that business, whereas under the "minimal contacts"
concept, plaintiff's claim must arise out of some contact
defendant has with the forum state.
Lerco,

Inc.

(1980) 610 P.2d 1307.

Roskellev

& Co.

v.

See also language

quoted on page 13 of defendants' brief.

[In our case

it is not claimed that defendants were "doing business"
in Utah; Long-arm jurisdiction is based upon the "minimal
contacts" concept since a substantial part of plaintiffs
claims arose out of Roeck's telephone calls into Utah
wherein negotiations and misrepresentations occurred with
respect to both the original and supplemental contracts,
and from his visit to etah where misrepresentations were
made which resulted in the supplemental contract being
executed in Utah.

The supplemental agreement substan-

tially changed the consideration being received by plaintiffs in the exchange]
(f)

Utah Court had long-arm

over non-

resident manufacturer whose goods were solJ through Utah
sales representatives. although the non-resiJent did not
Lrc·hT: -.

C:a:rnes,

-·-------

6:1 2

378.

The Court stated in part as follows (at 380):
"Due process
mandates consideration of:
(1) whether the cause of action arises out of
or has a substantial connection with the activitv;
the balancing of the convenience of the
parties and the interest of the State in assuming jurisdiction; an
(3)
the character of the defendant's activity
within the State." (emphasis added)

The Court then went on to state that:
"the defendant's activities
represent a
purroseful intrusion into the State which is
suf icient to supply the requisite factual
nexus between the defendant and the State.
Secondly, the State's interest in protecting
the ri hts of its residents who are adversel
a ected by the interstate activities o nonresident manufacturers outweighs any inconvenience the defendant ma¥ experience in
defending his activities in the State."
(emphasis added)
[As indicated above, a substantial part of plaintiffs'
claims arose out of Roeck's trip to Utah and the resulting
supplemental agreement there executed.

Reeck claims to

be a resident of Canada but when questions were asked
at his deposition concerning his place of residence he
gave evasive answers, first asserting that is place of
residence was with his brother's family in Canada,
although he admitted that there is a dispute as to Roeck's
claim of a share of ownership of the home.

(Reeck depo-

sition P. 3-4); that he does not reside with his family in
California although a current telephone call to that
address is met with a recorded message in the voice of
Reeck (Reeck deposition P. 4-13); and that he has another
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telephone listed

:- i.o :'

Calgary, Alterta, ranada

,J

cl li

l !l

l 3 - 1 s)

1
. c

convenience of the

l

1

1t is

that it wou:d

be less inconvenient for Roeck (who is hard to find) to
come to Ctah, particularly since he travels extensivelv
and could probably work his trips into other travel
plans, than to require plaintiffs herein to try to
locate Roeck as he travels about.

As indicated above,

Roeck made several "Purposeful intrusions" into the state
of Utah by making negotiation telephone calls into Ctah,
by sending letters and legal documents into Ctah, and bv
his purposeful trip to Ctah to negotiate a sutstantial
change in the contract

The character of Roeck's acti-

vity in Ctah is such that he could reasonably anticipate
required to litigate disputes arising out of that
contract in the State of Utah

Here Roeck found the tine

and monev to meet ·cith plaintiffs in the State of ltah,
and as observed in
P.

v. Lerco, 610 P 2d 1307 at

1313 "it does not 3.ppear that it 1-:ould be a hardship
J.cfend2nt if ':.e :_s r-equired to Jefe:id this l3wsuit

in this state
34

Corrections to "facts" stat<:od in C.:c·f,nJ:m'::s' Point l

.'lpplic;:ition of the actual "facts" to the
of l;:iw recitoJ

Jcfendants shows that the cases cited

def cnd;:ir.t support the Courts conclusion that long arrr. jurisciiction existed ;:ind show that the Court correctly denied defenJ;:ints' motion to dismiss.

See statement of facts on pages 2

Lhrough 12 above (, 1 througr. 31).

As observed above, some of

the errors by defendants in reciting the "facts" in Point I
of defendants' brief are as follows
(a)

Defendants incorrectly assert that plaintiffs

"did not controvert the statement in Roeck's affidavit
that the May 23, 1980 agreement ("original agreement") was
negotiated in Canada and California, not l:tah."
To the contrary,

(P. 11).

Roeck's affidavit does not state

that negotiations were not conducted by telephone or in
Utah (R. 25, t 3).

After filing of the Roeck affidavit

plaintiffs filed Kent's counter affidavit and their
amended verified complaint (R. 30-33

- copy attached

hereto as appendix "K") wherein plaintiffs set forth
specifically defendants' acts in and contacts with the
State of Utah, which include the following claims:
(1)

That, prior to execution of the original

agreement, Roeck made telephone calls from out of
state to officers of plaintiff who were in Utah;
that in those calls

Roeck made "most or all of the

misrepresentations as alleged in the original complaint," and that said calls were made as a part of
ol;:in and schere to defraud.
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(R. 31,

6(a))

(2)

After execution of the original agreement

Roeck came to Utah, engaged in negotiations, drafted
and signed an agreement ("Supplemental ,\greement")
(Ex. "I" to amended complaint - R.

34) which sub-

stantially modified the terms of the original contract.
The supplemental agreement wholly changed the land
being conveyed by defendants to plaintiffs and changed
other consideration to be received by plaintiffs in
exchange for the boat.

The amended complaint and Kent

affidavit also show that the supplemental agreement
contained additional affirmative written misrepresentation re (A)

the purported intent of defendants to

repurchase the land for $100,000.00,

(E)

that defen-

dants were preparing for a subdivision of that land
and (C) that other investors would be participating
therein.
(3)

The supplemental agreement also materially

changed the relationship between the parties in that
it gave defendants almost unlimited power to deal
with the land exchanged by defendants as they found
to be "necessary and fit" so long as the right of
plaintiffs to the Sl00,000.00 (repurchase price) was
not affected.

(R.

34).

Said misrepresentations

form a substantial part of the fraud claims asserted
in plaintiffs' original and amended complaints.
(R.

2-4, R.

30-39).

-

l CJ -

35. Defendants' incorrectly assert that the supplemental
agreement involved only ''incidental negotiations of a modification to the May 23, 1983, agreement" (P. 12) and that the
"purported modification agreement of March 17, 1981, concerning
which Roeck made his only physical contact within the State of
Utah,

is not an issue in this litigation."

(P. 14).

As indi-

cated above, the modification agreement which was negotiated,
drafted and executed in Utah (a) completely changed the consideration to be received by plaintiff for the boat in that an
entirely different tract of land was substituted for that
agreed to in the original exchange agreement, and (b) defendants
were given full power to deal with the land as they saw fit,
purportedly to assist defendants with their (misrepresented)
alleged subdivision of that land in anticipation of defendants'
exercise of their option to repurchase the land for $100,000.00.
The maximum benefit which plaintiff could have received from
the land was receipt of that sum from the exercise by defendants of said option to repurchase while in Utah and as a part
of the supplemental agreement.

Defendants reaffirmed their

prior misrepresentations (both orally and as a part of the
modification contract) re their purported intent to exercise
the option, the purported value of the land, its suitability
for subdividing, their purported "preparations" toward subdividing the land, the purported participation by "other investors,"
etc.

The fraud practiced in Utah in connection with execution

of the supplemental agreement is a substantial part of
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plaintiff's claims.

A copv of that scpplcmental a;reement is

attached as an exhibit to the amended complaint (R.
Appendix "K" hereto).

(c)

34 and as

Letters were sent into Vtah by

Roeck directing defendants' Canadian attorney to forward the
"Caveat" concerning the Canadian property described in the
original contract to plaintiffs.

(R.

37-38 - copy of attached

as Appendix "K" hereto).
36. Point I of defendants brief seems to be almost
entirely based upon their erroneous conclusion that the supplemental agreement (March 17, 1981) "is not at issue in this
litigation," (P.

14 & 15).

To the contrary, the allegations

of the amended complaint rely upon the supplemental agreement
(R. 31, • 6(b)) and a copy of said supplemental agreement is
attached hereto as Appendix "K".

With that corrected fact in

mind, the cases cited in defendants' memorandum support the
lower Court's decision, finding sufficient "minimal contact" to
justify exercise of long-arm jurisdiction, particularly ·.,·here.
as here, the cause of action arose out of that very contact in
Utah (making of the supplemental agreement).
37. Counsel for defendants also incorrectly states (P

14)

that the telephone calls made by defendants into Ctah "did not
involve negotiations for the sale and purchase of the subject
sailboat, citing Roeck's affidavit, R.

25, however that affidavit

makes no statements as to the content of said telephone calls.
On the other hand Kent's affidavit shows that in fact

"most er

all of the misrepresentations alleged in the

comolaint

"l

were made by Roeck
R.

31,

6 (a).

during said telephone conversations,

Defendants' argument that mail and telephone

calls are "insufficient activity within the forum state to
allow jurisdiction:

(P. 17) relies upon situations where the

letters and telephone calls were only "secondary or ancillary
factors," and are factually different from the true facts in
this case.

Where, as here, the fraud occurred in part in con-

nection as a part of the telephone calls made by defendants into
Utah and mail sent by defendants into Utah, it is not "secondary
or ancillary" and is sufficient, standing alone, to justify
long-arm jurisdiction.
38. Defendants conclude their Point I by stating that
it would be "repugnant to the fundamental fairness principal
of International Shoe" v. \lashing ton, 326 US 310, 66 S Ct 154,
90 LEd 95 (1945) to "require defendants to answer in Utah for
their participation in a transaction executed in the province
of Saskatchewan, the object of which was the exchange of Canadian
property for an ocean-going sailboat docked in California."

If

the facts were as stated by defendants we would agree with that
argument.

Defendants, however, omit to include in their fact

summary that (a) the original transaction was negotiated in part
bv telephone calls made by defendants into Utah in which substantial misrepresentations of fact were made which led to the
nriginal contract,

(b) that a supplemental contract was made

in Utah which substituted a different parcel of land to be
received by plaintiffs in the exchange, gave defendants an
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Sc''''.

option to repurchase that land for
a power of attorney to deal 1-:i th

t

'"J''

c3t land

1

111. ;;a'-'c• dE: ft'ndJnts
3S

the:1 "sa.,,· fit." ,.

(c) that while in Utah defendants r.oad<e both oral and i,Titten
misrepresentations of fact as to the value of the land, as to
its subdividability, investments by others in the project, stat1 15

of the subdivision project, etc.

With the full facts and cir-

cumstances in mind the arguments advanced by defendants support
exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by the Court.
39. Threshold jurisdiction established.

At the stage to

which the case had progressed, it was enough for plaintiffs to
show "threshold jurisdiction: sufficient to "demonstrate the
fairness of allowing them to continue suit here."

Roskellev v.

Lecero, 610 P.2d 1307 at P. 1310, quoting with approval from
U.S. v. Montreal Co., 358 F.2d 239 at pages 242-243

The Court

then held that the procedures from Rule 56(e), CRCP. re affidavits in motions for summary judgment was an appropriate
procedure in determing jurisdiction prior to trial.

The veri-

fied pleadings and Kent's Affidavit clearl:1 meet this "t!-'.reshoccl
jurisdiction: requirement and justified the Court in finding
that it had long-arm jurisdiction over defendants.
40. US Supreme Ct. holds that sanction of finding facts to
be established sucporting long-arm jurisdictior. coes not vio2.ate
due process.

In a fact situation much like our"s. the L'.'."

Supreme Court recently affirmed an order of

3

l·.:·uer Fedt:r3l

Court which ir:lposed as a sancti.on undE:r- !'.ule 37(\c) (:')
[i:.\·hich is p:-actic3.ll:1 iC.er.tical to

f'.=)

l'?,CP]

fP.CP
.J

determination that facts necessary to support a finding of personal jurisdiction

In that case the non-resident

defendants had (as in our case) repeatedly failed to comply with
Jiscovery and court orders compelling discovery.

Insurance Corp.

of Ireland, Ltd. et al., v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,

102 S. Ct. 2099 (June, 1982).
part at P.

The U. S. Supreme Court stated in

2106 as follows:

"By submitting to the jurisdiction of the court for
the limited ur ose of challen in
·urisdiction, the
de endant agrees to abi e by that court s determination on the issue of jurisdiction; That decision
will be res judicata on that issue in any further
proceedings."
(emphasis added)
At P.

2108 the Court stated in part as tolLows:
"Petitioners failure to supply the requested information as to its contacts with Pennsylvania supports
'i:l1epresumption that the refusal to produce evidence
. . was but an admission of the want of merit in
the asserted defense.'
(citations omitted) The
sanction took as established the facts - contacts
with Pennsylvania - that CBG was seeking to establish
through discovery.
That a particular legal consequence - personal jurisdiction of the court over the
defendants - follows from this, does not in any way
affect the appropriateness of the sanction." (emphasis added)

In a like manner defendants in our case should be precluded
from contesting the finding of the Court that sufficient
minimal contacts existed to establish jurisdiction by reason
of their failure to comply with discovery orders.
41

Conclusion.

The trial Court properly concluded

that defendants h::id made sufficient purposeful "minimal conrcJcts" h'ith the State of Utah to permit the Utah Courts under
notions of justice and fair play to require the

-
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defendants to defend this lawsuit in

which lawsuit

resulted in substantial part from those purposeful activities
by defendants in Utah.

Accordint;l:1.

the decision of the lm-er

Court re existence long-arm jurisdiction should be affirmed.

POINT II
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ASSESSED DAMAGES AFTER HEARING.
42. Counsel for defendants incorrectly argue that no
hearing was held before assessment of damages.

The Court held

such a hearing and gave defendants full opportunity to appear,
present evidence, and to make appropriate objections.
43. The facts surrounding the entrv of judgment are set
forth in

23 through 30 above, which shows t11at:
(a)

Counsel for defendants attenced the hearing

which resulted in imposing sanction of striking of answer
and entry of defendants' default for failure to comply
with discovery orders

25 above - copy of order attached

as Appendix "G") .
(b)

Counsel for defendants objected to entry of

judgment without a hearing to assess damat;es

26 above

R. 266-271).
(c)

The Court on its own motion scheduled a hearing

re those objections.

(, 27 above - R

258,

264 - Appendix

"H" hereto).
(d)

Court hearing was held Cil 28 above - •'.ppend1x "I"

hereto) at which defendants were represented bv counsel
At that hearing some of the relief sought bv plaintiffs

-

1'

-

(lein on Canadian land) was denied and the Court ordered
plaintiffs to file an affidavit in support of their claims
for damages

Counsel for defendants had full opportunity

to object to Court's procedure, but failed to do and
cannot now raise that issue for the first time on appeal.
(e)

The required affidavit re damages was filed (See

29 above).

Thereafter, the Court entered its judgment,

a copy of which is furnished herewith as Appendix "J".
It is important to note that the judgment expressly provides that upon prompt return of the boat in good condition the $352,000.00 of damages for conversion would be
deemed satisfied, and that the Court would determine the
amount of credit to be allowed if the boat was returned
under different circumstances (see

2 of judgment).

The

judgment for $100,000.00 rental value during the period
while the boat was detained is based upon plaintiffs'
affidavit and punitive damages are assessed based upon
fraud and misrepresentation as detailed in that affidavit.
The boat has not been and probably never will be returned.
The judgment was and is justitied under the circumstances.
(f)

No counter-affidavit was filed by defendants; no

objections were made by defendants to the affidavit or its
sufficiency; and no objections were made by defendants
to the terms of the judgment itself.

Issues re the suf-

ficiencv of the Court's procedures are raised for the
first time on appeal.
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44. Hearing was held.

From the foregoing it is apparent

that defendants were well represente<l at all stages of the
proceedings; that a hearing was in fact held at which counsel
for defendants were given an opportunity to present evidence,
to object, etc.; that a detailed affidavit was filed by plaintiffs in support of their claim for damages, rental value and
punitive damages, which affidavit included a detailed recital
of the various acts of fraud and deceit practiced by defendants
upon plaintiff,

(R. 272-277).

The Court was fully justified

in entering said judgment based upon the record in this matter
and that affidavit.

That affidavit was requested by the Court

pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), which reads in part as follows
"If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment
it is necessary to .
. determine the amount
of damages or to establish the truth of any averment
by evidence or to make any investigation of any
other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or
order such references as it deems necessary and
proper." (emphasis added).
Whether or not such a hearing is held is discretionary with
the Court since the rule uses the word

The Court, how-

ever, ordered such a hearing and requested plaintiffs' file a
supporting affidavit.

Defendants failed to object to the

sufficiency of the affidavit and thereby waived any objection
that they might have raised with respect to the content of
the affidavit.

See Fox v. Allstate Ins. Co.

22

c

(2d) 383'

453 P.2d 701; Strange v. Ostlund (1979) 594 P 2d 877.
failed to object to the affidavit,

-·
c-

Having

given the District Judge the opportunity to correct any possible error, defendants cannot now raise that question for the
first time on appeal.
45. Cannot raise issue for first time on appeal. Rule 46,
URCP, eliminates the need for formal exceptions to the Court's
rulings, but does not eliminate the requirement that some objection be made to the trial Court if the question is to be preserved for appeal.

That rule reads in part as follows:

"Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court
are unnecessary.
It is sufficient that a party, at
the time the ruling or order of the Court is made or
sought, makes known to the court the action which he
desires the court to take or his objection to the
action of the court and his grounds therefor;
(emphasis added)
Counsel for defendants wholly failed to "make known to the court
the action which he desired the court to take" with respect
to plaintiffs' affidavit or the content of the judgment itself, or
their objections (if any) thereto, as required by that rule.
Having failed to do so they cannot now raise those objections
for the first time on appeal.
14 U.2d 133; Corner v.

Nelson v. Blomquist, 378 P.

2d 891,

Inc., 387 P. 2d 85; Stagmeyer v.

Leatham Bros., Inc., 439 P.2d 279, 20 U.2d 421.

Failure to move

for a new trial precludes defendants from raising on appeal the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment.

Brighan v.

Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n., 470 P.2d 393, 24 U.2d 292
46. Appeals limited to law questions.

The foregoing rules

are not mere technicalities, but are founded upon constitutional
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limitations on the power of the Suprcrc Court

Art VIII. § o

of the Utah Constitution reads in part as rollows
"From all final judgr.icents c'f the distric courts.
there shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme
Court. The appeal shall be upon the record made
in the court below
In equitv cases the
appeal may be on questions of both law and fact,
in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions
of law alone."
Unless a party calls the question from which an appeal is taken
to the attention of the Court and obtains a ruling thereon from
the Court from which ruling an appeal can be taken, there is
no question of law involved.

It is onlv from an incorrect

of law by the trial court that an appeal to the Gtah Supreme
Court will lie.

such a ruling all that exists is a

question of fact which is not reviewatle bv the Supreme Court
That rule is also founded upon the sound principal that a par:··
should not be permitted to lead the Court into error t·; failing
to call a matter to the attention of the trial court so that
appropriate correction could be made without the necessitv of
an appeal.
47. The Securitv Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. lie st,

292, 437 P. 2nd 214 11968) mentioned on pagE

c·

of defendants'

brief was a situation involving reversal of an order of the
District Court refusing to vacate a default judgr.ient
trial court had no evidence in support of its

the
nf

damages in its default judgment
tinguishable in that (as indicated on P
held, a detailed 2.'.°Ld.:r:it ·.:as fi :cc.'.

:·l

,i ',11',

c)

1

::c ·1:-1 t:..;

·.\J::-

;r1cticed bv defendants and the darrages sustained by plaintiffs
i:,d ·,-,ao a'1ail.:ible to the Court in determining the amounts to
.:is a ?art of the judgment.

Defendants in our case

had a full opportunity to object to the affidavit, to present
addition.:il evidence, etc. to the Court prior to or following
entry of judgment.
48. Conclusion. The judgment as framed by the Court was
fair and just under the circumstances, particularly where, as
here, it was awarded as a sanction for repeated failure to
comply with discovery and repeated disobedience of court orders.
POINT III
THE COURT \.;As JCSTIFIED IN STRIKrnG DFFF.NDANTS' AtlS\..'ER AND
E'.'1TERING DEFACLT JCDGNENT IN VIEW OF DEFENDANTS' REPEATED DISOF DISCOVERY ORDERS
49

Su=ar1 of disobe.,ed court orders.

For the conveni-

ence of the Court, and to assist in more fully understanding
the frustration experienced by plaintiffs and the Court from
defendants willful and repeated disregard of discovery and
orders corr:pelling discoverv, we have set forth

7 through

31 a surr.mary of the court proceedings which led to the Court

striking defendants' answer and entering of the default
jud[rnent, and have attached hereto as an appendix, copies of
VAYious minute entries and Court orders which defendants dis-
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Appendix "A" - 7-15-82 - orders production of docuDE'nts
and appearance by Roe ck for deposition ·.;i thin S da?s
after denial by Supreme Court of defendants' petition
for interlocutory appeal.
Appendix "B" - 8-19-82 - order requiring production of
documents by 8-16-82 and that Roed: appear for deposition no later than 8-27-82.
Appendix "C" - 8-26-82 - orders that Roed: appear for
deposition no later than 9-3-82 and that, upon failure
to do so upon ex-party application, defendants' answer
will be struck and default judgment entered for relief
requested.
Appendix "D" - 9-3-82 - partial copy of Roeck deposition
where Roeck refused to answer questions and wal\·ed
out of deposition after 15 minutes of questions
Appendix "F" - 11-18-82 - orders that Roeck appear for
his deposition and produce documents within 10 days
and that Roeck not leave deposition until excused by
counsel for plaintiffs; that upon failure to comply
the court will feel compelled to strike answer and
enter default.
Aptendix "G" - 12-29-82 - orders answer struck and deault judgment be granted.
50. Failure of defendants to corrununicate with their la,,-;er
is inexcusable.

From the foregoing it is clear that the Court

was most tolerant of defendants' excuses and that the Court
repeatedly gave defendants additional chances to cornpl;1 but
that defendants wilfully failed to do so.

The only point raised

on appeal by defendants is that Roeck allegedly had no notice
of the orders and accordingly no opportunity to comply,
dants' brief, pages 27-29).

In support of that claim,

(defendefendant:'

brief cites the following unsworn declaration b? Jones, cocounsel for defendants (R.

256-257)

"The undersigned further declares that the defendant
Hans
Reeck
beer.
for __
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45 davs, outside the continental United States, and
has received absolutely no notice or knowledge of
any of the proceedings or orders leading up to and
including the apparent order of the above entitled
Court striking defendants' answer in the above
entitled matter and for entry of judgment against
defendants and in favor of plaintiffs." (emphasis
added) .
That motion is dated Januray 5, 1983,

(R. 256-257), which

means that Reeck had not been in contact with his counsel since
about November 21, 1982,

(a Sunday), however counsel for defen-

dants motion for permission to withdraw states that Roeck has
not been in oral cormnunication with his attorneys since September 10, 1982, and has not been in written cormnunication since
October 7, 1982,

(R. 227, 'J 3).

That motion for permission to

withdraw is based upon Roeck's "failure to maintain contact and
communication with his lawyers throughout this litigation,"
(R.

226, 11 1).

Apparently that failure on the part of Roeck

to cormnu::licate with his lawyers continued through March 14, 1983,
when the judgment was signed by the Court, since there were no
further offers by Roeck to appear for the taking of his deposition and no documents were produced within that time.

Apparently

the October 7, 1982, communication was Roeck's September 21,

1982, affidavit (R. 204-206) wherein he offered to return to
Scilt Lake Cit:1 to complete the deposition (R. 206,

5).

Notwith-

standing that offer by Roeck to return and submit to deposition,
he wholly failed during the following six months to contact his
counsel to determine whether or not his offer to return had
been accepted.

It is difficult to believe that said offer was

::iade in good faith \·:hen he thereafter completely ignoreo his
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attorneys and the pendir.g_

.,·r11cccl::..:·

of a client to Keep in cont.Jct

'.1•_'

· 11'.-,

.1t'1

rr:cl

ments based upon lack of actual notice to

1(

is

c!1ent (Defendant•

brief page 27) when lack of notice resulted solelv from Roeck's
willful failure to communicate uith his attorcie:;s

51. Counsel for defendants finally argues (P
"defendants' failure to comply

29) that

the court's discovery

order is excusable," without offering any reasonable excuse
other than that Roeck simplv chose to ignore the Court's orders.
failed to keep in contact with his attorneys for approximatelv
6 months (or more), and ignored his obligations in this lawsuit
It is doubtful, in view of the conduct of Roeck, that the documents would have been produced or the deposition would have
been taken had the Court given defendants another 6 months
Either the discovery rules mean something or they don't.

If

every lawsuit were met with this type of misconduct the Courts
would be clogged and justice would be denied
to obey court orders cannot be tolerated.

Repeated refusal

To tolerate such mis-

conduct would wholly destrov our svstem of law and order which
is based upon compliance with Court orders
5:'. Prior decisions affir.:iing sar.ctiors for failure to
perrr.it discovec:
sanctions b·.'

T1-:e Uta.h Suprer;;e

in various

r-2s

1:.-firmel:

\0!

ln Tucker Realt·1, Inc. v. [;unlev, 16 l'. 2d 97,
:,10,

the l'tah Supreme Court affirr.ed a judgment

awarded because defendant did not comply with pretrial
discovery order to produce documents suppotting claim
of discharge of promissorv note.
(b)

In W. '.-1

Villae;e, Inc.,

& vi.

(1977)

E. Gardner, Inc.

•1.

Park West

568 P.2d 734 the l'tah Supreme Court

affirmed a default judgment where there had been a frusCration of the judicial process, as where (as here) the
I

failure to respond to discovery impedes trial on the
merits and makes it impossible to ascertain whether the
allegations of the answer have any factual merit.

[In

our situation, the disregard by Roeck of discovery orders
was far more outrageous than the fact situation in the
above-quoted case.

In that case belated arswers to

interrogatories were served after the motion and prior
to the hearing and the Court imposed the sanctions without first making an order coopelling discovery]
53. Possible remittitur. Should the Court determine that
the punitive damages award are excessive (we believe that they
·..;e::-c fully justified under the circumstances) this \;ould be
Jn
1

case for the Court to order a remittitur as to
["LHt of the punitive damages and to affirm the balance of the
See Ctah State Road ComI'.1. v. Johnson, 550 P.2d 216.
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54. A substantial part of plaintiffs' claim arose out of
fraud and deceit, practiced by Roe ck in Utah,

in conne::tion

with negotiation and signing of a supplemental contract which
substantially changed the rights of plaintiff under the exchange
agreement, which the Court properly found to constitute sufficient "minimal contacts" for the Court to exercise long-arm
jurisdiction over the defendants.

Defendants repeated failure

to comply with discovery orders justified the Court in finally
striking the answer and entering/Judgment by default.

Defen-

dants' counsel participated in/the hearings, which resulted in
/

the judgment, which judgment'was supported by a detailed affidavit re fraud and deceit by defendants and resulting damages to
plaintiffs.

Defendants Maived any objection that they might have

raised to the

of that affidavit by failing to otject

to the affidavit or/to the judgment itself.

Defendants cannot

contest the sufficiency of said affidavit for the first time on
appeal.

Defend,B.nts have had their opportunity to litigate the

matter on it¥ merits and have refused to do so.

It is unlikel\'

I

that defen¢'ants would behave any differently if a new trial "ere
granted, based upon their prior misconduct as discussed above

)35. The Court's judgment should be affi rr:ied.

I

Dated the 1st day of September, 1983

,\2( ; '._ .
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"Ronald C. Earker, attorne:; for ;claintff(s
Svnergetics and Lancer Industries. Inc.
,

I

t:_ /: '

RObrt L. Loru\ attorre·; for
Enterprise:s, Inc.
.
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(a)

In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 U2d 97, 396 P.2d

410, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a judgment

awarded

because defendant did not comply with pretrial discovery order
to produce documents supporting claim of discharge of promissory
nute.

(b)
Inc.

In W. W.

& W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village

(1977) 568 P.2d 734 the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a

default judgment where there had been a frustration of the
judicial process, as where (as here) the failure to respond
to discovery impedes trial on the merits and makes it impossible
to ascertain whether the allegations of the answer have any
factual merit.

[In our situation, the disregard by Reeck of

discovery orders was far more outrageous than the fact situation
in the above-quoted case.

In that case belated answers to

interrogatories were served after the motion and prior to the
hearing and the Court imposed the sanctions without first making
an order compelling discovery].
(c)

In Empire Corp

v. Empire Credit, Inc., et al. #16237

an unreported Utah Supreme Court decision filed January 3, 1980,
(copy furnished as Appendix "L" hereto) the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed a similar order in striking the answer and entering
default judgment for $84,800.0C as a result of a similar repeated
failure of the defendants to comply with discovery orders.
that decision the Court stated at page 3 in part as follows:
"Thou§'h it is true that the courts should be
indulgent in setting aside default judgments
to the end that controversied be resolved on
their merits, it is also true that there must
be an end to such patience and indulgence."

-

1 /1

-

In

--

:o\';;u:u:nrs.

ct

,i]-

\'

MP.RAfHON RANCHING,

53. Possihle remittitur.

co.,

et al.

#19143

Should the Court determine that

the punitive damages award are excessive (we believe that they
wc·n· fully justified under the circumstances) this would be an

appropriate case for the Court to order a rimittitur as to a
part of the punitive damages and to affirm the balance of the
See Utah State Road Comm. v. Johnson, 550 P.2d 216.

iudgment.

CONCLUSION
54.

A substantial part of plaintiffs' claim arose out

of fraud and deceit, practiced by Roeck in Utah, in connection
with negotiation and signing of a supplemental cor,tract which
suhstantially changed the right of plaintiff under the exchange
agreement, which the Court properly found to constitute sufficient "minimal contacts: for the Court to exercise long-arm
jurisdiction over the defendants.

Defendants repeated failure

Lo comply with discovery orders justified the Court in finally
striking the answer and entering judgment by default.

Defendants'

counsel participated in the hearings, which resulted in the
judgment, which judgment was supported by a detailed affidavit
re fraud and deceit by defendants and resulting damages to
plair.tiffs.

Defendants waived any objection that they might

have raised to the sufficiency of that affidavit by failing
to object to the affidavit or to the judgment itself.

Defendants

cannot contest the sufficiency of said affidavit for the first
time on appeal.

Defendants have had their opportunity to

litigate the matter or. its merits and have refused to do so.
is unlikelv that defendants would behave any differently if a
new trial were granted, based upon their prior misconduct as

It
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